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 When I learned that the Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission had decided 
to provide judges with information comparing the financial costs and recidivism risks of 
several different sentencing options in a particular case, I did not ask:  “Why would they 
do this?  How could they take such an ill-chosen path?”  Instead, I asked:  “Why did it 
take so long?” 
 I welcome, and indeed applaud, the refinement that the Sentencing Advisory 
Commission has imported into the sentencing structure in Missouri.  To me, it is time to 
consider next how we can build upon this reform initiative and transplant it, with 
dispatch, across the country.  But I have found that there are those, including individuals 
whom I deeply respect, who are resistant to this change – those who, by all appearances, 
want to keep us in the “same ole, same ole” sentencing box in which uninformed, and 
sometimes misinformed, sentencing decision making is the norm.  So it is advisable, in 
my opinion, to take some time to respond briefly to the concerns they have proffered 
about the provision of comparative cost-risk information to judges and the factoring of 
that information into their sentencing decisions. 
 I have set forth below some of the primary reasons why I believe the institution of 
the practice of allowing judges access to some very basic facts about the financial cost of 
several sentencing options they are mulling over and their effects, in terms of recidivism 
reduction, is not only appropriate, but laudable.  
 1.  Judges already engage in cost-benefit assessments, though typically crude 
ones, when imposing sentences.  To suggest that the consideration by judges of the 
relative costs and risks of varying sentences is radical and unseemly is, first, to ignore the 
reality that judges already do this every day.  Judges often grapple, for example, with 
such questions as what sentence would be most effectual and advisable for a burglar or 
chronic thief who committed a crime to secure money to support a drug habit.  The 
judges are trying to determine, as best they can, whether society’s interests, including its 
interest in being protected from future crimes, would be best served by a community 
sanction combined with drug treatment or, alternatively, by a period of incarceration.  
The judges are, in short, undertaking a cost-benefit analysis.  
 2.  Judges should engage in cost-benefit assessments as part of the sentencing 
decision-making process.  Not only do judges already weigh, though roughly, costs, risks, 
and benefits when rendering sentencing decisions, but they also should engage in this 
kind of reflective, rather than reflexive, decision making.  Let me offer a medical analog.  
As a doctor is determining the optimal way to respond to a medical problem, who would 
protest if the doctor considered the full range of treatment options available, including the 
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risks, costs, and benefits of each option?  And who would condemn the doctor for 
choosing the cheapest alternative, one that has a much higher success rate than the most 
expensive option, or, conversely, for choosing a more expensive alternative when it poses 
a significantly diminished risk of death?  We, of course, want and expect the 
professionals to whom we have entrusted our lives and health to look at the pros and cons 
of the various medical-care options.  Similarly, there is nothing remiss or askew in also 
wanting and expecting judges, those to whom we have entrusted decisions bearing on our 
and others’ liberty, property, and safety, to carefully weigh the pros and cons of various 
sentencing options.    
 There are those, however, who decry the overt and official importation of 
comparative cost-risk information into sentencing decision making on the grounds that it 
will lead to disparity in sentencing.  The apparent concern is that one judge, when 
sentencing, may factor the costs and risks in one way, another judge may accord differing 
weight to the same costs and risks, and a third judge may ignore those costs and risks 
altogether.  However, concerns about unwarranted disparity due to the differential 
treatment of a sentencing factor extend to all sentencing factors, not just financial costs 
and recidivism risks.  One judge, for example, may give more weight to a victim-impact 
statement than another judge does in a case with almost identical facts.  In the end, 
concerns about disparity are not to be discounted, but their resolution must be addressed 
through the structuring of the overall sentencing system rather than by precluding judges 
from considering facts relevant to sentencing.  
 3.  It is advisable and efficient for the financial costs and recidivism risks of 
various sentencing options to be calculated by experts who then transmit this information 
to a sentencing judge.  It would be odd, after concluding that judges already do and 
should consider the comparative cost-effectiveness of differing criminal sanctions, to bar 
judges from receiving feedback to make that assessment process more accurate and 
efficient.  Insisting that judges can only conduct uninformed cost-benefit analyses 
obviously would make no sense.  So instead of requiring judges, who are not financial 
analysts or criminologists, to individually calculate the financial costs of a particular 
sentence or the recidivism risks it poses, Missouri, quite wisely in my opinion, remits 
these calculations to the experts – the sentencing commission.  But while the sentencing 
commission is the number cruncher, the final decision as to what is a cost-effective and 
just sentence in an individual case is left, as it should be, to the sentencing judge.   
 4.  The consideration by judges of the costs and risks of the varied sanctions that 
they could impose on a defendant comports with, and indeed furthers, sentencing 
objectives, including retribution.  One of the principal arguments propounded in 
opposition to the practice of tendering cost-risk information to judges for their 
consideration when crafting the most appropriate penalty in a case is that it undermines 
sentencing objectives, particularly retribution.  Opponents intone that judges are 
supposed to select a sentence based on what a defendant deserves, not on what a sanction 
costs.  One could write an article, perhaps even a book, dissecting this argument and 
refuting the assumptions on which it is grounded.  But the following four points 
particularly warrant highlighting now: 
a. The notion that judges are only to focus on retribution – on “just deserts” – 
when sentencing a defendant conflicts with the dictates of the sentencing 
statutes to which judges are bound to adhere.  For example, the federal 
sentencing statute requires judges to consider a number of sentencing 
purposes and factors when choosing a sentence, including what sentence is 
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve “adequate deterrence” 
and to protect the public from future crimes committed by the defendant.1
b. The feedback mechanism in Missouri not only gives judges information about 
the immediate fiscal costs of a sanction but also empirically validated data 
about the benefits of that sanction, in terms of the likelihood that a defendant 
subject to this penalty will not recidivate and be imprisoned.  This latter 
information can prove insightful as judges strive to comply with statutory 
directives, like the one recounted above, to consider the effect of a sentence 
on the defendant’s future propensity to commit a crime. 
c. The concern that feedback tools like those utilized in Missouri will mark the 
demise of retribution as a sentencing objective rests on several 
misperceptions.  Perhaps most fundamentally, those fretting about this 
innovation overlook the truism that confinement is not the only way to exact 
punishment for criminal misdeeds.  Community sanctions can also serve 
retributive aims; they can also be punishing, as legislatures themselves 
recognize.2   If anyone doubts that proposition, I encourage that person to 
volunteer to be subjected, even for two months, to electronically monitored 
home confinement, GPS monitoring, intensive supervision probation, day 
reporting, or any of a range of other sanctions that limit the relatively 
unimpeded freedom that so many of us take for granted.  So even if a 
sentencing system were single-mindedly focused on securing “an eye for an 
eye,” there are different ways, figuratively, to gouge out an eye, none of 
which would be foreclosed by an informed cost-risk assessment.  
d. Even if we were to assume that retribution is the end-all of sentencing (a 
proposition with which I, a subscriber to the precepts of restorative justice, 
emphatically disagree), a judge’s comparison of the costs and recidivism risks 
of various sentences promotes, rather than detracts from, the retributive 
objective.  This objective, properly construed, is subject to what is known as 
the “parsimony principle.”3  According to this principle, when judges are 
deciding whether to imprison someone for a crime, they must apply the “least 
1 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
2 See, for example, ALA. CODE § 12-25-32(2)(b) for a long list of what the state 
legislature has described as “intermediate punishments” to be served within communities.  
3 For a discussion of this principle and its longstanding roots, see NORVAL MORRIS, 
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 59-62 (1974). 
restrictive (punitive) sanction necessary to achieve” penal purposes.4  Thus, if 
a judge were to determine that a defendant’s crime was serious enough to 
warrant either probation, accompanied by certain stringent conditions, for a 
defined period of time, or imprisonment, the judge would typically be obliged, 
under the parsimony principle, to impose the community sanction.  
5.  Judges’ consideration, at the time of sentencing, of reliable data about the 
financial costs and recidivism risks of various sentencing alternatives does not usurp 
legislative prerogatives.  There has been much ado that the Missouri reform initiative 
somehow encroaches on the dominion of legislators.  I confess that, for me, this argument 
is a head scratcher.  Here’s why: 
First, as noted earlier, informing judges about the costs and recidivism risks of 
sentencing alternatives enables them to not only meet, but better meet, sentencing 
objectives laid out by the legislature.  Instead of, for example, deferring to the perhaps 
unsubstantiated statements of a defense attorney, prosecutor, or probation official who 
prepared the presentence report that a particular penalty will or will not promote the 
rehabilitation or specific deterrence that will dissuade the defendant from committing 
additional crimes in the future, a judge can consider, as one of many sentencing 
considerations, whether the data indicate that these assertions are well grounded. 
Second, it is the legislature itself that accords judges the sentencing discretion 
whose exercise can affect the type of penalty to be imposed, its duration or amount, and 
the conditions that will attend certain community sanctions.  So when judges consider 
facts that will allow them to choose which of the sentencing options authorized by the 
legislature is, in a particular case, the most effective and fiscally responsible means of 
implementing the legislatively prescribed sentencing objectives, the judges can hardly be 
said to be flouting the will of the legislature or derogating its authority. 
Third, the view that only legislatures should consider the sentencing implications 
of cost-benefit assessments like those being instituted in Missouri overlooks one 
ineluctable point:  There are multiple individuals and entities involved in sentencing 
decision-making processes.  As the Supreme Court observed in Mistretta v. United 
States, “the sentencing function long has been considered a peculiarly shared 
responsibility among the Branches of government and has never been thought of as the 
exclusive constitutional province of any one Branch.”5  The multiplicity of parties 
making sentencing-related decisions often incorporate their perceptions about the 
financial costs of sanctions and their impact on recidivism into those decisions. So even if 
we were able – somehow, someway – to foreclose judges from undertaking cost-benefit 
analyses when imposing sentences and even if we wanted – for some inexplicable reason 
-- to foreclose them from identifying the most cost-effective way in an individual case to 
fulfill sentencing objectives dictated by the legislature, the same cost-benefit assessments 
would continue to be replayed in other realms outside the legislature.  Perhaps most 
4 Id. at 59. 
5 488 U.S. 361, 390 (1989). 
notably, such cost-benefit analyses would continue to pervade the shadow world that has 
such a profound effect on sentences – the world of plea bargaining. 
Fourth, I have heard some grumbling that the ostensible encroachment on the 
legislative function that follows from judges’ consideration of financial costs and 
recidivism risks may even abridge the constitutional separation of powers.  Mistretta, in 
my opinion, belies that argument.  In that case, the Supreme Court rebuffed the 
contention that the emplacement of the United States Sentencing Commission within the 
judicial branch of the federal government violated the separation of powers.  The Court 
emphasized that Congress continued to be vested with the legislative authority to define 
the “broad limits” of sentences – the minimum and maximum sentences that could be 
imposed for a federal crime.6  Similarly, under the new informational construct in 
Missouri, the state legislature continues to set the broad limits of sentences, and judges 
continue to exercise the traditional judicial function of identifying the most appropriate 
sentence within those limits.   
6.  The open dissemination of information to judges about the financial costs and 
recidivism risks of differing sentencing options in a case will bring more transparency 
and accountability into the sentencing process.  “Transparency” and “accountability” 
may be buzzwords to some, but I believe, and strongly so, in their inherent value – in 
their importance to ethical and accurate decisions.  So yes, I would opt for having a 
sentencing commission make empirically validated information available to judges and, 
in turn, the public about the financial costs and recidivism-reduction benefits of differing 
sentencing options in a case.  This practice is far preferable to having judges continue to 
make sentencing-related decisions based on their own hunches and assumptions about 
such costs and risks.  Such decision making based on gut feelings inevitably yields 
sentences that pose greater hazards to the public’s safety than would other sentences, are 
a wasteful expenditure of the government’s limited resources, and unnecessarily curb 
individual liberty.    
____________________ 
 I unabashedly favor endeavors, like the one in Missouri, to better inform judges’ 
sentencing decisions and to bring more transparency into the sentencing process.  
Missouri, commendably, has provided a foundation upon which other jurisdictions can 
now build as they develop further refined structures for collecting, disseminating, and 
considering data about the financial costs and recidivism risks of the sentencing options 
available to a judge in a particular case.  Jurisdictions, for example, may develop cost-
risk matrixes that include even more sentencing alternatives than the “regular probation,” 
enhanced-supervision probation, prison, and shock probation about which Missouri 
judges can receive information.7  But however these structures are finetuned, Missouri 
6 Id. at 396. 
7 See MO. SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM’N, 2 SMART SENTENCING, ISSUE 
5, at 2-3 (Aug. 17, 2010).  
has paved the way.  Thankfully.  
